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The ready availability of large corpora has opened a range of interesting possi-
bilities for linguistic research, and Geoﬀrey Sampson’s article illustrates that
a corpus-based perspective can also motivate revisiting the general direction
and methodology of linguistic research. At the same time, the discussion in
Sampson’s article pushes two issues to rather extreme conclusions, which I
think could be useful to revisit here: i. the issue of grammaticality and its
role in linguistic research, and ii. the development of a scientiﬁc linguistic
methodology, addressing the role of introspection and alternative ways of
obtaining and evaluating data.
Turning to the ﬁrst issue, Sampson argues against the grammatical/ungram-
matical distinction underlying generative linguistics, proposing that one can
only describe language usage, which he pictures as paths in open grassland—
some paths are more frequently taken, but any path is in principle possible.
While the linguistic preoccupation with grammaticality arguably deserves to
be revisited, throwing out grammaticality altogether and replacing it with
a description of whatever language happens to have been used seems like
1throwing out the child with the bath water. What the advent of generative
linguistics provided was a focus on language as a system that can be mod-
eled in a way making testable predictions. It replaced the backward looking
description of traditional linguistics with a process aimed at establishing
generalizations over the observed patterns, which could be used to make
predictions about previously unseen data. But as soon as one turns from
descriptions to generalizations and predictions derived from those, one ex-
presses statements about which sentences can be licensed and which cannot.
The move that turns linguistic theories into falsiﬁable scientiﬁc proposals
thus is inseparably tied to the question which sentences are licensed by a
particular theory and which are not, i.e., the issue of grammaticality.
Interestingly, Sampson’s own, pioneering work on the linguistic annotation
of the SUSANNE corpus showcases that it is meaningful to establish gener-
alizations over lexical classes and phrase structure, and that the rules used
in the annotation of the corpus data support a parsing system making de-
cisions about which strings can be licensed, i.e., are grammatical. Or in
the words of Sampson (2000): A parsing system “automatically produces
analyses (according to some parsing scheme) of input language examples. A
parsing scheme deﬁnes the target which a parsing system hits (or misses).
The SUSANNE Corpus represents part of the deﬁnition of a parsing scheme.”
Grammaticality thus serves an important function in constraining the in-
ﬁnite set of possible sentences based on a ﬁnite representation generalized
from observations, i.e., a linguistic theory or grammar. Modifying Samp-
son’s metaphor of language use as paths in an unobstructed prairie, it thus
seems that language use is more akin to the paths in a mountain region—
there still is a wide range of possible paths, but the terrain rules out certain
ones for general use; by looking at the topography, one can thus make pre-
dictions about where new paths could arise in the future (e.g., alongside a
river as opposed to going up the north face of a mountain).
We see an immediate beneﬁt of characterizing language use in this way when
we see how well it matches the well-established characteristics of language
change: “Language change is not a completely random, unprincipled devi-
ation from a state of pristine perfection, but proceeds in large measure in
a remarkably regular and systematic fashion” (Hock 1991, p.2). In other
words, it is not as though all linguistics can do is observe people use and
2change language in unrestricted ways—there is a constraining topography
underlying language use, and studying it can result in linguistic theories
that make scientiﬁc predictions about possible language use and change.
Turning from the role of grammaticality to the question whether this as-
pect has become too dominant in generative syntactic research, let us make
another comparison: Language use is constrained by grammaticality in the
same way that architecture is subject to the laws of statics—a wide range
of houses with many diﬀerent functions can be built, but certain construc-
tions will not hold up even though they could have been useful. While this
comparison maintains that grammaticality structures the space of possible
language use, it also makes clear that it is only a small portion of what lin-
guistics can and should analyze—just like the laws of statics are an essential
part of building a house even though most of the thinking of an architect
concerns other aspects of the house and its use. The at times exclusive fo-
cus in generative linguistics on an autonomous syntax and grammaticality,
emphasizing core language phenomena for a homogeneous community of ide-
alized speakers, arguably has fostered theory-internal debates, abstracting
away from the data until the core supports some postulated (but beautiful)
principles and assumptions. At the same time, generative linguistics clearly
has started moving beyond the glass bead games in the halls of autonomous
syntax. While this article is not the forum to give a detailed analysis of these
developments, let me just cite two encouraging examples: Firstly, aspects
once stipulated in syntax are now recognized to be explainable through the
interaction of diﬀerent modules of linguistic analysis and an explicit analysis
of the integration of a sentence into the discourse. The predictions of such
theories arise through an interaction of constraints, e.g., connecting syntax,
semantics, and information structure (cf., e.g., De Kuthy 2002). Secondly,
restrictions once included in the model of syntactic competence have con-
vincingly been argued to result from human sentence processing eﬀects (cf.,
e.g., Kluender 1998). While both of these developments cut syntax down
to size by relocating some of the constraints to other modules of linguistic
competence and performance, they keep the central assumption of grammat-
icality, supporting linguistic theories that make scientiﬁc predictions about
unseen data.
In conclusion, instead of following Sampson’s proposal to throw out gram-
maticality and the predictive power of linguistic theory, it seems more pro-
3ductive to support the reorientation of linguistic analysis towards interacting
modules of linguistic competence and performance, and to ground linguistic
theorizing empirically by highlighting that a theory is only as good as the
empirical insights it provides.
This naturally leads over to the second aspect of Sampson’s article to be dis-
cussed here, the use and the problems of introspection for empirically ground-
ing linguistic theories. Sampson argues that introspection has no role to play
in a scientiﬁc enterprise. Instead of native speaker intuitions, he proposes
to rely exclusively on “interpersonally-observable evidence”(p.15). Sampson
unfortunately does not list what he considers to fall under interpersonally-
observable evidence, but given that the empirical discussion in the paper is
based entirely on corpus data (and anecdotes), we can safely assume that
Sampson considers corpus data to be a key component in this regard. Using
corpus data as evidence for linguistic analysis combines two aspects of lin-
guistic methodology which are useful to make explicit here: On the one hand
there is the question how example sentences that are relevant to a particular
research question can be obtained. On the other hand one needs to decide
whether an example sentence one has obtained is actually part of the lan-
guage one is studying. How to obtain and how to evaluate example data are
two separate questions, which generally require separate answers (cf. Meurers
2005).
The typical method for obtaining example sentences in generative linguistics
ﬁrst considers which properties a relevant example sentence should have and
then hand-constructs an example realizing those properties. Such examples
usually are not instances of actual language use and typically no context is
provided for them. The hand-constructed examples are then evaluated by a
native speaker (often the author of the paper) judging whether the sentence
is part of their language or not.
In contrast, Sampson in this paper answers the question of how to obtain
relevant example sentences by querying an annotated corpus for a set of ex-
amples ﬁtting a particular pattern. He then evaluates the example data in
two ways: First, he analyzes the obtained examples based on how frequent
they are in the corpus. Second, he classiﬁes individual examples by distin-
guishing “Dunster constructions” from “clearly normal constructions” (p.8).
Sampson characterizes Dunster constructions as “a construction which be-
4fore I encountered it I would not have thought of as available in my language,
but which after confronting a real-life example I come to see as a valid possi-
bility which had been available to me all along.” Nothing is said about how
Sampson identiﬁes “clearly normal constructions”, but it seems most likely
that this judgment is equally based on his intuition as a native speaker of
English. Overriding his characterization of intuition as incompatible with a
scientiﬁc process, Sampson thus relies on speaker intuitions for the evaluation
of example data.
An arguably relevant diﬀerence between the use of intuition by the generative
linguists Sampson discusses and his own use of intuition is the fact that his
intuitions are about real-life examples from corpora, whereas the intuitions
he discusses as problematic are based on hand-created example sentences.
Much can be said in support of using corpus data for linguistic research, and
annotated corpora can support searches for sets of examples that are rele-
vant for the construction or validation of linguistic theories (cf., e.g., Meurers
2005). Making explicit why corpora deserve to play a major role as source of
examples for theoretical linguistics, in Meurers and M¨ uller (2007) we argue
that for studying a linguistic phenomenon “one needs to reduce examples to
whatever properties are relevant for the linguistic issues being researched and
to vary selected properties in order to explore the grammatical correlations.
This is a complex undertaking that assumes an understanding of what prop-
erties can play a role for a given linguistic issue—which often is far from clear
[...] Corpus data obtained by searching for a linguistically relevant pattern
exhibits a wide variation of known and unknown parameters and can include
information on the context, as needed for exploring the interaction of con-
straints from syntax and formal pragmatics. When searching for a particular
pattern in a corpus, it thus is possible to observe the theoretically interesting
pattern within sentences that exhibit a wide variation of lexical, syntactic,
semantic, and contextual properties; this makes it possible to obtain a better
picture of which of these properties are relevant for a given phenomenon. The
fact that corpus examples generally are natural and contextualized can also
be helpful whenever examples are to be evaluated through introspection.”
The limits of obtaining data for theoretical linguistic research from corpora
should not be overlooked though. Corpora are ﬁnite representations of lan-
guage use and as such can never contain evidence for or against all linguistic
generalizations one might want to test. Given Zipf’s law that the frequency of
5use of the nth most frequently used word or other phenomenon in a corpus is
inversely proportional to n, even the largest corpus will appear small for lin-
guistic research looking for speciﬁc patterns and theoretical predictions. We
here should also remember the point argued above that corpora are merely
a source of examples—they do not eliminate the need to evaluate whether a
speciﬁc example obtained is representative of the language to be analyzed.
Turning to other methods for evaluating example data, the quantitative anal-
ysis of corpus data for theoretical linguistics is another rarely used option.
Stefanowitsch (2005) illustrates that the common rejection of quantitative
analysis in generative circles is based on an impoverished notion of quantita-
tive analysis. An analysis comparing the relative frequency of constructions,
taking into account the frequency of its parts and the mode of construction,
can support linguistic judgments which are much more sophisticated and
linguistically insightful than those built on analyzing bare frequency alone.
Turning to other methods for evaluating linguistic judgments about exam-
ple data, it is somewhat surprising that Sampson does not mention the well
established and validated experimental methods which have been developed
over the past decade. As already highlighted by Vasishth (2003), Cowart
(1997) and others have established standard procedures for designing syn-
tactic experiments which address Sampson’s concerns about unreliable in-
tuitions. Such controlled experimental setups have been shown to provide
reliable grammaticality judgments from random samples of native speaker
subjects. Arguably this is just the tip of the iceberg of methods which in
recent years have become available for empirically grounding theoretical lin-
guistic research. For example, psycholinguistic production and perception
experiments, neurolinguistic imaging techniques, or the analysis of transfer
in second language acquisition all provide empirical evidence characterizing
the set of linguistics categories and forms to be modeled by linguistic theo-
ries. They constitute examples of “interpersonally-observable evidence” and
some directly address Sampson’s concerns about introspection. But none of
these methods are mentioned in Sampson’s article, presumably because they
are not as such dependent on corpus data.
Arguably the biggest mistake of generative linguistics was to throw out most
sources of empirical evidence, from rejecting the use of corpora to down-
playing the relevance of historical linguistic evidence or observations about
6variation in language use. Replacing the narrow generative perspective with
a view that is narrowly corpus based, in which the only evidence considered
is the language which happens to be used in a given corpus, would amount
to replacing one half-blind extreme with another. Any single methodology
can mislead, overemphasize some aspects and hide other aspects from view.
So while the use of corpus data has much to contribute towards empirically
grounding theoretical linguistic research, the key to a successful linguistic
science lies in a plurality of methods. Mountain regions are best explored
with all our senses.
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